PPIs and transport infrastructure: Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean by Tei A & Ferrari C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Tei A, Ferrari C.  
PPIs and transport infrastructure: Evidence from Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
Journal of Transport Geography 2017 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2017.10.012 
 
 
Copyright: 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2017.10.012  
Date deposited:   
09/11/2017 
Embargo release date: 
01 May 2019  
 1 
 
PPIs and transport infrastructure: Evidence from Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
 
Ferrari Claudio – University of Genoa 
Tei Alessio – Newcastle University 
 
 
Abstract 
In the recent past, several governments tried to promote infrastructure investments using different 
policies and funding schemes. Strategies have been differentiated over time, among regions, and in 
relation to specific political choices. The paper focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean in which 
different political approaches have been developed together with a quite different geographical level 
of characterisation, representing a significant case study to better understand how political and 
institutional intervention might incentivise local and/or foreign investors, shaping the organisation of 
the infrastructure network. Therefore, the current research analyses the transport-related projects 
included in the World Bank database on private participation in infrastructure (from 1980 to 2015) 
highlighting main patterns in terms of institutional, social and economic characteristics that might 
influence the investment in transport infrastructure in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Our panel 
analysis – that includes data collected from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
local government websites – shows a clear link between government strategies and the related 
outcome in terms of transport investments. In particular, in addition to the size of the investment, a 
positive (and significant) impact of being part of a regional organisation emerges, as well as the 
involvement of private companies. 
Keywords: 
Public private investments; Transport investment; Latin America and the Caribbean; Regional 
development; Transport policy 
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1. Introduction 
The transport system is a key factor in the developing strategy of a country (Banister-Berechman, 
1999). As part of the fixed capital, it favourably contributes, together with macroeconomic stability, 
openness and the quality of institutions, to determine the investment climate (Stern, 2001). This is 
important to continuously attract investments and foster economic growth that, under certain 
circumstances, might determine higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and hopefully a more 
equal distribution of GDP among the population, hence a real social and economic development. 
The research for rapid economic development, able to foster efficiency in the domestic industries, has 
led several developing and emerging economies to attract private (foreign) companies to speed up 
the modernisation of the main economic sectors. The potential positive effects of attracting both the 
know-how and the capital of private operators have been widely documented either by literature 
(e.g., Aschauer, 1989; Araujo and Sutherland, 2010) or official international reports (e.g., IMF, 2015). 
Therefore, many countries have opened local markets to foreign companies to attract new capitals or 
build up joint ventures to transfer not only funds but also technologies and know-how (Roumboutsos, 
2016). 
Despite a general agreement on the positive effects of this process, some authors (e.g., Bogliaccini, 
2013) argued that market openness in certain world regions, such as Latin America, had a downward 
effect in increasing internal inequalities. Despite this, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) demonstrated that, 
from 1950 to 1998, market openness and capital investment determined average annual growth rates 
higher than before liberalisation. The debate on the effects of market liberalisation and economic 
openness on a certain region has been investigated only partially and linked to the economic structure 
of many developing countries. Since many of these countries base their economy on export-oriented 
industries, the regional endowment of infrastructures impacts their international trade. For this 
reason, Wilsmeier et al. (2006) emphasise how the presence of specific transport infrastructure (i.e., 
seaports) may influence the international transport connectivity and the role of a region into the 
international trade network. Apart from specific benefits related to the openness to international 
markets, economic literature deeply discussed the beneficial role of infrastructure endowment on the 
local or domestic economy (e.g., Ottaviano, 2008; Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2012) in terms of 
cost savings or increased productivity. Moreover, there is the possibility of achieving spillover effects 
on wider areas (e.g., Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1995; Bottasso et al., 2014); similar results are also 
coherent with the New Economic Geography approach (e.g., Krugman, 1991). 
In general, transport investments are considered a leverage to foster international trade and provide 
a basis for promoting internal growth. This issue is even more important for developing countries that, 
due to a lack of funding, have been promoting different and innovative kinds of investment policies in 
accordance with specific institutional choices. In fact, while literature has often investigated the causal 
relation between transport choices and government prescriptions (e.g., Verhoef, 2000), the effects of 
institutions (e.g., governments and regional authorities) on transport investments and transport 
network have been considered only recently. An example of this issue is represented in Europe by the 
Trans-European Network-Transport TEN-T framework (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, while the link between the role of institutions in transport development has been  
addressed (at least partially) in many industrialised regions (e.g., Gutierrez et al., 2011; Kemmerling 
and Stephan, 2008), showing the beneficial role the institution can have in terms of promoting 
transport system integration and planning, not many studies focused on the effects of institutions on 
 3 
 
transport investments and how these investments can foster regional economic wellness in 
developing regions (e.g., Banister and Berechman, 1999; Short and Kopp, 2005). The current study 
contributes to filling this gap by studying a geographical region, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 
hat experienced different forms of governments and institutional influences in the past decades. Thus, 
being able to understand the role of different national and international institutions in promoting a 
regional transport project can help in generating improvements in both planning activities and the 
efficiency of the overall resource allocation. These two elements can positively affect the overall level 
of regional integration. 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the effects that regional institutions had on the transport 
network and how these institutions influenced the attractiveness of the region for private operators 
and external partners influencing the regional transport system. In order to achieve the 
abovementioned goal, data from international organisations and local governments have been 
collected for the past 36 years (1980–2015) from Latin American and Caribbean countries. In order to 
collect the dataset, the World Bank database on Private Participation in Infrastructure will be used 
because it is the main international information source for infrastructural PPIs in developing countries. 
Other public sources (e.g., the IMF and government websites) have been used to collect main 
macroeconomic (e.g., import, export, GDP and population) and political (e.g., government and 
international cooperation agreements, such as Mercosur and World Trade Organization (WTO) data. 
The analysis will consist of a panel regression aiming at investigating the effects of institutions on 
transport investments and on the development of the transport network in the studied region. The 
geographical scope of the research focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean for both the different 
political experiences made during the period (with military and right- and left-wing governments) and 
the countries’ participation at regional and international trade organisations. 
The paper is organised as follows: After this brief introduction, Section 2 focuses on the main issues 
related to PPIs and government choices, and Section 3 describes the geographical scope of the paper. 
Section 4 discusses PPIs in Latin America, while Section 5 introduces the regression analysis. Section 6 
presents the results of the research. Finally, Section 7 addresses the conclusive remarks and discusses 
potential future research. 
 
2. Background 
Infrastructure investments can be fostered through different policies, including public initiative, 
private intervention and international collaborations. Given the fact that many developing economies 
need funds and know-how, several international reports (e.g., Makovsek et al., 2014; OECD, 2013) 
have suggested PPIs as an important instrument to develop public infrastructure and exploit the 
economic potential of a region. 
According to the World Bank definition (WB, 2007) public–private partnerships (PPPs) (often another 
name to define PPIs) are agreements or contracts between the public and private sectors to jointly 
operate and/or own infrastructure projects. These partnerships relate to several sectors (e.g., 
telecommunications, energy and transport) and may be addressed to the management and/or 
construction (/renewal) of an infrastructure. As suggested by Hall et al. (2003), the fact that PPIs can 
also involve already built infrastructure makes PPPs a substitute of the more traditional privatisation 
processes (mainly for political and ethical reasons) to allow the private sector to enter the 
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management of public infrastructure. For this reason, several reports (e.g., WB, 2007; Araujo and 
Sutherland, 2010; UNESCAP, 2011) often neglect the distinction among PPP, PPI, private finance 
initiative (PFI) and private sector participation (PSP); all of these terms are used to describe the same 
situation. Specific distinctions among the abovementioned terms are due to different contractual 
obligations of either the public or private party and on the need to just manage or build the related 
infrastructure. For the purpose of our study, and also as mentioned in the World Bank database (WB, 
2007), we will use the term PPIs (and PPPs) as a broad set of collaborations between public authorities 
that aim to involve private actors in the management and/or the construction of an infrastructure. 
Moreover, the kind of private involvement in the projects may differ in several contexts and so the 
infrastructure may be either completely private or public at the end of the “partnership”. It is 
important to distinguish PPIs from foreign direct investments (FDIs): PPIs might be included in the FDIs 
if (at least) a private partner is represented by a foreign company, even if this is not always the case.  
Furthermore, several authors (e.g., Chou et al., 2015; Chou and Pramudawarhani, 2015; Aerts et al., 
2014; Tang et al., 2010; Medda, 2007) discussed potential critical issues related to the PPIs, such as 
investment risk management and the relationship among the investors and the project governance 
organisation. For this reason, different sectors are characterised by different structures of PPIs, having 
different elements of characterisation (e.g., Gangwar and Raghuram, 2015; Panayides et al., 2015; 
Meersman et al., 2014). Nevertheless, since the most important role of PPIs is fostering regional 
investments, this investment tool seems appropriate as a proxy to investigate transport network 
development within a specific region. 
Concerning the regional transport network, different studies pointed out the potential benefits of 
improving the role of certain nodes (or regions) within international networks (e.g., Ducruet, 2013). 
Additionally, according to Cherif and Ducruet (2016) and Wang and Ducruet (2014), regional 
institutional and industrial backgrounds affect both local planning and the presence in international 
or local network. Thus, transport policy can affect regional development and presence in international 
trade. The importance of considering regional aspects in contemplating transport investment has 
been underlined also by Wilmsmeier and Monios (2016) when discussing the port policy of a sample 
of Latin American countries and how path dependency can affect transport and economic 
development. For this reason, the current study will focus on transport investments (in terms of PPIs) 
and some socioeconomic regional characteristics in order to better understand the role of regional 
and national institutions in fostering the local transport network. 
Latin America and Caribbean have been also studied in relation to their involvement within the main 
trade routes that recently fostered the regional economic development. Both Wilmsmeier and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) and Ng et al. (2013), for instance, underlined the difficulties in terms of 
infrastructure management and investment provision of many regional countries that are currently 
struggling – in terms of performance – in coping with industry needs, often generating extra-costs for 
the trading companies.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the importance of PPI projects worldwide by showing the growing trend of the 
value of this kind of investment. While the figure summarises different kinds of projects, a similar 
value can be collected concerning only the transport sector. Data highlight that Latin America and the 
Caribbean account for the majority of the projects, followed by South Asia and East Asia, respectively. 
Concerning the role of single countries, it is worth mentioning that in every region, main countries 
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attract the majority of the funding; therefore, Brazil and Mexico together register 60% of the overall 
value for the studied region.  
 
Figure 1: Trend in PPIs world wide 
 
Source: World Bank PPIs Database, 2016. Data in millions of US$. 
 
Regarding the role and openness degree of a specific country in the world economy, Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008) suggested an openness indicator given by the ratio between the sum of imports and 
exports and the GDP. Figure 2 shows this indicator together with the value of the PPIs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean for the transport sector. As shown in the figure, general openness decreased during 
the first years of the 1980s (mainly due to a strong reduction of imports during 1980–1985). After that 
period, with the exception of a few peaks, this openness stabilised on a growing trend (with the 
average growth rate of both exports and imports two times higher than that of the GDP). Moreover, 
until the mid-2000s, the openness value seems correlated with the PPIs. Even if starting from 2009, 
the growth continued independently. Thus, it is fair to say that at the beginning of the studied period, 
the closure of many countries – openness decreasing period – affected the transport investments – 
and then the PPIs, with a value close to zero – while the market liberalisation and the increasing 
openness modified the institutional framework, increasing the need for efficient transport solutions 
and then PPIs in the transport sector, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Comparison between Openness degree and PPIs value. 
 
Source: Own Elaboration on IMF and WB data, 2016.  
 
3. Data and geographical scope 
The passage from investment to development is not immediate; it is "intermediated" by several 
factors and conditions that have been widely discussed (and still are today) in literature. At the same 
time, the complexity of the whole process makes general and theoretical economic rules, that 
necessarily have to abstract from a particular economic context, not so much useful to predict the 
economic consequences of any economic intervention. Therefore a case study approach represents a 
good complement to the macroeconomic studies. 
As mentioned earlier, the geographical scope of this paper is Latin America and the Caribbean, as 
defined by the United National macro-regional classification. This region comprises more than 30 
countries, even if the list varies depending on the international organisation listing the countries 
(mainly because of the possible exclusion of some island states and other territories). It is important 
to emphasise that in all of the main lists of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, Cuba and 
Puerto Rico are normally included. Nevertheless, due to a lack of reliable data, these two countries 
are excluded from this analysis. Figure 3 shows the country location and main PPI project 
development. 
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Figure 3: PPIs spatial distribution 
  
Source: Own Elaboration based on WB database, 2016. 
 
Furthermore, countries belonging to this region are located in three different subcontinents (i.e., 
North, Central and South America), and they are quite heterogenic in terms of economic, geographical 
and social characteristics. Thus, the sample is characterised by big countries (e.g., Argentina and 
Mexico) and small countries (e.g., Antigua and Barbuda), together with countries having emerging 
economies (e.g., Brazil) and those with developing economies (e.g., Chile). Similarly, considering the 
Human Development Index (UNPD, 2016), the range of country development seems quite heterogenic 
(with “developed” countries, such as Chile, and “underdeveloped” ones, such as Haiti). Specifically, 
the sample of countries includes 9 island states, 12 South American countries, 1 North American 
country, and 14 Central American and Caribbean countries. Moreover, another cultural factor of 
differentiation is the language in which most of the countries have as a common mother tongue (i.e., 
Spanish); however, nine states are not Spanish-speaking countries, and the majority of these countries 
are English-speaking countries. 
In addition, this heterogeneity is well demonstrated by the different political characteristics, as shown 
in Figure 4. The figure presents the duration (in years) of governments ruled by left- and right-wing 
parties, as well as other forms of governments (e.g., military government). In fact, while many studied 
countries were ruled by military during the 1980s, this trend has been modified over the years with a 
differentiated structure during the 1990s, the predominance of a socialist coalition in the 2000s and 
the presence of many conservative governments lately. Figure 4 also shows that the first PPIs were 
supported mainly by conservative parties (more related to the idea of traditional liberalism); however, 
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starting in the 2000s, PPIs grew exponentially, even if the majority of governments were more socialist 
(traditionally less inclined to involve private and international companies).  
 
Figure 4: Governments and Investment trend 
 
Source: Own Elaboration based on public government data, 2016. 
 
The political differences among the studied group of countries also affect their participation in the 
main regional and international trade organisations. While many South American countries participate 
in either the Mercosur Community (established in 1991) or the Andean Community (established in 
1969), the other countries struggle to be part of common regional communities that foster regional 
cooperation. Thus, Mercosur appears as the only regional form of cooperation in terms of common 
regional economic policy aimed at promoting trade and investments. Concerning this organisation, 
Venezuela and Bolivia have recently joined the four Mercosur founders (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Paraguay), forming a larger form of the organisation in the region. In terms of international 
cooperation, almost all of the countries entered into the WTO in 1995, benefiting from this kind of 
cooperation since the beginning. Thus, from an institutional point of view, international institution 
appears all the same for the majority of the countries, but they differ in space and time in terms of 
internal and regional policies. 
Considering the main statistics of the studied countries, Table 1 shows the average value of the main 
economic statistics of the analysed countries from 1980 to 2015.  
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Table 1: Country statistics (period 1980-2015) 
 Export FDI Abroad FDI in GDP PPP Import Pop 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0.05 0.00 0.06 1.14 0.36 72,944 
Argentina 31.07 0.73 4.26 454.27 26.10 35,590,778 
Bahamas, 
The 
1.33 0.00 0.22 5.49 2.78 289,389 
Barbados 0.31 0.02 0.11 2.91 1.06 263,611 
Belize 0.18 0.00 0.04 1.33 0.43 242,889 
Bolivia 2.89 0.00 0.32 30.79 2.74 8,041,806 
Brazil 87.57 4.41 20.52 1,641.10 78.45 164,464,472 
Chile 28.37 3.09 5.92 177.63 25.96 14,693,472 
Colombia 18.03 1.21 3.86 289.48 19.61 38,533,778 
Costa Rica 4.98 0.08 0.70 31.59 6.86 3,623,750 
Dominica 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.13 71,457 
Dominican 
Republic 
1.52 0.01 0.79 57.29 6.89 7,982,361 
Ecuador 8.12 0.00 0.32 82.89 8.35 12,103,361 
El Salvador 3.21 0.02 0.22 27.69 6.18 5,700,417 
Grenada 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.72 0.20 100,389 
Guatemala 2.92 0.00 0.28 57.18 6.00 10,962,333 
Guyana 0.55 0.00 0.06 2.71 0.73 741,833 
Haiti 0.35 0.00 0.03 11.42 1.17 8,217,917 
Honduras 1.65 0.01 0.32 18.36 3.54 5,931,333 
Jamaica 1.24 0.01 0.28 16.04 3.32 2,508,306 
Mexico 147.77 3.16 12.15 1,139.77 158.17 96,177,528 
Nicaragua 0.86 0.01 0.22 14.35 2.17 5,454,045 
Panama 0.69 0.15 1.07 29.77 4.38 2,927,694 
Paraguay 2.76 0.01 0.11 26.70 3.89 5,086,139 
Peru 13.63 0.06 2.47 156.93 12.80 24,465,722 
Suriname 0.85 0.00 0.00 4.31 0.77 483,538 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
5.64 0.11 0.46 21.36 4.04 1,251,389 
Uruguay 3.24 0.01 0.64 33.70 3.96 3,203,722 
Venezuela 34.80 0.51 1.47 294.30 20.39 22,898,528 
Source: IMF, 2016. Monetary value are in billions of current US$. 
 
It is quite evident that the countries’ main economic variable varies considerably among each country, 
with the South American countries and Mexico representing the vast majority of the population and 
economic value of the whole area. Despite this, many countries registered a high level of growth 
during the past decades and a high value of human development indexes (UNDP, 2016). 
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4. PPIs in Latin America and Caribbean  
Concerning the PPIs considered in this study, starting from 1980, the number of transport projects in 
the region grew considerably from only 1 project per year in the 1980s to more than 40 projects per 
year during the past decade. In total, more than 960 projects are included in the study for a total value 
of approximately $246 million (USD). Among the studied projects about 60 of them have been delayed 
or even cancelled over the studied period). 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the PPIs among the studied countries. Brazil accounts for more than 
40% of the overall number of projects, while for four other countries that share is similar and around 
11% of the overall value. The remaining 10% of the projects are distributed almost equally among the 
remaining countries (even if a few of them did not register PPIs in the studied period, such as Antigua 
and Barbuda, Suriname and El Salvador). 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of PPIs in the transport sector 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration from WB data, 2016. 
 
Regarding the mode of transport developed through the PPIs in the studied period, it is clear from 
Figure 6 that a large part of the initial sum invested through the PPIs is directed to develop seaports 
and roads; only later have PPIs been used to improve the railway sector. 
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Figure 6: PPIs per mode of transport and year 
 
Source: Own Elaboration from WB data, 2016. 
 
Looking at the countries and transport projects involving PPIs, it is significant that in the region, the 
following five countries concentrate almost the totality of the value of the all PPIs (in order of the 
value of the total investment): Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Chile and Peru. Moreover, in the 
case of the railway sector, about two-thirds of the investments have been developed in Brazil, while 
there is not spatial concentration for the kinds of infrastructures. In a few cases, unsolicited projects 
are also present. This last fact means that some private operators are proactive in terms of promoting 
PPIs and then investing in specific infrastructures (mainly ports). 
As anticipated above, PPIs can be used to foster private intervention or foreign investments. Both of 
these elements appear quite different in the studied countries, with approximately 40% of the projects 
involving a foreign partner while the majority of the projects registering private participation as a 
minority of the overall investment value. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that looking at the 
PPI data segmented per mode of transport (i.e., road, rail, air and sea), a bigger proportion of the 
earlier investments was dedicated to international nodes, such as seaports and airports. However, in 
a second phase, the main focus of the investments is connected to internal infrastructure, such as rail 
and road networks. 
Generally, investments in the transport network have an essential role in enhancing intraregional 
integration and international cooperation. Looking at the cooperative network fostered by the link 
between the location of the investor and the related beneficiary, 38 countries can be identified. Of 
those countries, 20 of them are investors, while the remaining 18 are net beneficiaries. Approximately 
three-quarters of the monetary flows generated by the 90 edges of the network (Figure 7) move from 
a high-income country to a developing country, but the remaining quarter is made of flows across two 
developing countries. In general, each investing country has selected a limited number of beneficiaries 
(from one to four) to which they direct their economic interests (as testified by the out-degree index). 
China (including Hong Kong) registers PPIs in six Latin American and Caribbean countries, and Germany 
registers PPIs in five countries. However, the United States and Spain invest in 10 LAC countries. The 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Before 1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015
Airports Ports Railways Roads
 12 
 
reasons behind these last figures seem quite clear: for the United States, geopolitical reasons as the 
spatial proximity to the Panama Canal, one of the main gateways of international trade, and the 
cultural and traditional closeness for Spain.  
 
Figure 7: Latin America and Caribbean PPIs’ Network  
 
Source: Own Elaboration based on WB database, 2016. 
 
Moreover, it seems notable that 2 countries (i.e., India and the Philippines) out of 20 investing 
countries (not belonging to the Latin American and Caribbean region) are classified by the World Bank 
(in the list released on December 2016) as lower middle-income countries; China is an upper-middle-
income country, and the remaining 17 countries are high-income countries. The link demonstrates the 
degree of cooperation that PPIs can foster among a variety of different countries. 
Among the beneficiary countries, the analysis of the in-degree indexes shows that the most active 
countries are Brazil and Peru (index equal to 12), followed by Mexico and Colombia (index equal to 
10). These four countries group half of the country pairs. Moreover, Mexico and Argentina are the 
countries more investing in Latin American and Caribbean countries, in seven and five LAC countries, 
respectively. These last figures show how PPIs are fostering international cooperation outside the 
region and how they are used to promote a transformation of the macro-regional transport system to 
increase the overall transportation supply and regional connectivity. Thus, while it is easy to identify 
the role of PPIs in the transport system, the role of a government initiative in increasing regional 
connectivity is worth of further investigations. 
In order to achieve the goal of the study, PPIs will be used as a proxy to the transport investment 
policy of a certain state. Economic and social variables are listed in Table 1, while other institutional 
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variables are tested, including policy characteristics (i.e., the type of government, the participation of 
specific regional organisations and a presence in the WTO), cultural elements (i.e., language) and 
geographical characteristics (i.e., island state and location in South America). Moreover, institutional 
choices in terms of PPIs have been tested in terms of private participation in the project and the 
involvement of at least one foreign partner in the project.  
 
5. Government influence 
While PPIs and economic and social variables vary over time following a specific trend (as well as the 
government-type variable), other institutional and geographical variables are binary elements that 
work as activating factors if and when a country registers a specific characteristic (i.e., participation in 
Mercosur). Data have been collected from the World Bank (PPI-related information), the IMF 
(economic and social statistics) and government websites (e.g., politically related information). 
Table 2 presents all of the variables that have been tested. 
 
Table 2: List of considered variables 
Variable Meaning Characteristics Variable Meaning Characteristics 
Count State n.a. Pop 
Population in the 
reference country 
Millions of people 
Y Year of reference 1980-2015 South 
Location in South 
America 
Dummy variable 
CAN 
Participation to the 
CAN in the reference 
year 
0= not member, 
1=member 
WTO 
Participation to the 
WTO in the reference 
year 
Dummy variable 
Export 
Value of exported 
goods and services 
Billions of US$ Govt 
Type of government 
in the reference year 
0=other form of 
government, 
1=right wing 
party, 2=left wing 
party 
FDI_Abro
ad 
Value of the FDI 
abroad by a certain 
country 
Billions of US$ PPP_tot 
Number of projects 
in the referenced 
country 
Absolute value 
FDI_IN 
Value of the FDI 
received by a certain 
country 
Billions of US$ 
PPP_tot-
VALUE 
Value of projects in 
the referenced 
country 
Value of US$ 
GDP_no
m 
GDP at nominal value Billions of US$ 
Private_pe
rc 
Average Percentage 
of Private 
participation in the 
PPI 
Ratio 
GDP_PPP 
GDP at purchase 
power parity 
Billions of US$ Foreigners 
Average Percentage 
of Foreign 
participation in the 
PPI 
Ratio 
Import 
Value of imported 
goods and services 
Billions of US$ Openess 
Ratio between the 
sum of Import and 
Export with the GDP 
nominal value 
Ratio 
 14 
 
island Being an island state Dummy Value no spanish 
Being a no-Spanish 
speaking country 
Dummy variable 
Mercosu
r 
Participation to the 
Mercosur in the 
reference year 
Dummy variable    
 
 
Other variables have been collected (e.g., specific forms of PPIs and other regional agreements), but 
the low level of reliable information and the minimum amount of common records suggested to avoid 
further characterisations. Moreover, it is important to underline that the IMF released an openness 
indicator (more related to the economic liberalisation); however, since it covers only the last 15 years, 
the indicator has been replaced by a ratio similar to those estimated by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). 
All the data were collected for the overall studied period, which allowed us to develop a panel 
regression analysis and consider the changes of the variables for 29 countries in the 36-year period 
(1980–2015). Thus, the total number of observations amounts to 1,044 records. The fact that some 
time-varying variables register only a few modifications over the different periods (e.g., the 
government) has been taken into account in the analysis development for the implications that this 
can cause to the analysis. 
As for a standard panel regression (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2013), some methodological problems 
could arise in terms of the heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of variables. The 
general panel definition is the following:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  with i=1,2,…,29  and t=1,2,…,36 
i represents the number of countries, t signifies the time period, y stands for the dependent variable 
(i.e., PPI in transport), and X represents the set of independent variables. 
Panel models can differ depending on the assumption on uit. According to this assumption, different 
kinds of panel regression can be utilised. Depending on these assumptions, pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are a viable solution, but fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE) models can be 
considered more suitable to achieve the results of the analysis. The main differences among the two 
latter models rely on different assumptions of the effects of uit in the estimation. In general terms, 
where N is large, uit could be considered as effects with a random distribution acting as independent 
variables (i.e., RE) more than unobserved constants (i.e., FE). Thus, in the FE models, uit=ui+vit in which 
the first term represents the constant observed effect that is time independent for the correlated 
variable, while the second term fulfils the usual condition on errors. Since the RE model assumes that 
covariates and effects are approximately independent and cannot be guaranteed by the used 
variables, we assumed the FE model as the standard tool to perform our investigation. Moreover, the 
use of the FE model helps to avoid multicollinearity issues to evaluate country-specific effects. 
Eventually, one of the outcomes of the model is the evidence of a within and between variance that 
investigates the variation related to specific subgroups instead of among elements included in the 
same subset of the factors. A reduced within variation is normally considered a good element of fitting. 
Moreover, several tests have been performed on different alternatives to better understand the 
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differences among specific variables and their effects on the investment performed on the transport 
network. 
Among the different tested models, one pool OLS is shown (Model 1) in which the dependent variable 
(i.e., the number of PPIs) has been connected to several geographical and institutional variables, 
showing how the market openness (in terms of participation in interregional trade organisations, 
foreign intervention in the PPI and participation in the private sector), geographical conditions and 
type of government can affect the investments in the transport network. Models 2–8 show the results 
of the FE models mixing different independent variables. In particular, the dependent variable in 
Models 2–5 is the number of PPIs, while the dependent variable in Models 6–8 is the annual value of 
the project in the referred country. Since there was a different nature of the dependent variable, there 
was no sense in using the same set of independent variables for the two different dependent variables. 
Despite this, Models 5 and 6 represent an exception to this statement. Table 3 shows the main results 
of the analysis. The columns in the table distinguish different models (i.e., as anticipated or differ from 
each other either for the type of estimation or the applied set of variables), while the rows include the 
variables contained in the model. Empty spaces mean that the specific variable is not included. For 
instance, Model 1 represents a pooled OLS in which the independent variables are private 
participation, government type, the presence of foreign companies, participation in the Mercosur or 
Andean communities and being located either in an island or in South America.  
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Table 3: Results of the performed analysis 
  Pool OLS - Number of PPIs FE - Number of PPIs FE - PPI Value 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
const 
−0.0260 −0.128 −0.099 −0.947*** −2.155*** −232.225 396.850*** 354.388*** 
0.21 0.169 0.163 0.22 0.225 132.139 135.586 2.981 
Private 
0.059*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.024*** −1.462   −1.58415 
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 1.611   −1.0411 
Govt 
−0.0004 0.288** 0.145 −0.010 0.035 32.287 4.045   
0.116 0.115 0.111 0.099 0.092 54.163 51.503   
Foreigners 
−3.081***   −1.370*** −0.899*** −0.549* 309.47   375.081** 
0.44   0.388 0.345 0.323 189.49   2.093 
Mercosur 
2.724***   3.048*** 1.382*** 1.022*** −262.749   −616.43*** 
0.314   0.354 0.331 0.314 184.188   −3.490 
Pop 
      0.068*** 0.165*** 12.22 −57.790*** −54.238*** 
      0.012 0.014 8.079 9.768 −5.491 
WTO 
−0.304   −0.259 −0.021 −0.170 −14.4282     
0.478   0.396 0.351 0.324 190.42     
Import 
        0.039*** 17.580*** 28.755*** 24.947*** 
        0.011 6.284 5.89 4.25 
Export 
        −0.0747*** −27.049*** −51.134*** −49.717*** 
        0.011 6.674 6.516 −7.709 
FDI_Abroad 
        −9.735*** −0.012     
        0.001 0.02     
FDI_IN 
      0.001*** 0.001*** 0.191*** 0.149*** 0.151*** 
      0 0.001 0.009 0.008 18.654 
CAN 
−1.160***               
0.249               
island 
−0.101               
0.205               
south 
0.449**               
0.228               
GDP_PPP             5.027*** 5.423*** 
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            0.503 10.655 
LSDV R-
squared 
  0.59 0.62 0.7 0.75 0.6 0.64 0.64 
LSDV F(38, 
1005) 
  47.71 50.19 68.47 78.31 39.85 51.65 50 
P-value(F) 1.90E-121 
1.00E-
170 
1.50E-187 7.40E-239 1.90E-270 2.70E-172 1.00E-194 1.20E-196 
Within R-
squared 
0.43* 0.23 0.29 0.45 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.56 
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6. Results 
Table 3 shows how pure geographical factors are rarely considered since they are often not significant. 
Despite this, Model 1 shows positive significant effects for the “south” element, underlining the 
possibility of a positive effect of certain geographical characteristics on the capability to promote PPIs 
in the transport sector. 
Nevertheless, institutional factors are often significant with the capability of attracting foreign and 
private capitals and the participation in regional organisation that always have significance. It is 
interesting that private participation normally registers a positive coefficient in connection with the 
number of PPIs and a negative coefficient for the value of the projects, while foreign participation is 
characterised by the opposite signs. These findings seem to emphasise how specific categories of 
investors are likely to be specialised in either big or small projects with governments that probably 
prefer to promote foreign participation in big projects; however, they normally are more willing to 
assure more projects (in terms of quantity) to domestic firms. At the same time, big projects tend to 
have higher public participation in comparison with small investments. Similarly, the participation in 
international organisations is significant only for regional institutions (e.g., Mercosur) with a general 
positive coefficient related to the number of PPIs but not to the value of the projects, again probably 
in connection with the willingness of the governments to foster several small projects within the 
regional cooperation instead of big strategic investments. Concerning local institutions, the variable 
“Govt” is not often significant, but it generally has a positive effect on transport investment. The 
overall results of the institutional elements seem to confirm the great role of government and 
institutions in attracting private capital and in fostering the development of the national transport 
network. Moreover, a differentiation in terms of specific investors also seems to be linked to the 
possibility that governments may prefer different kinds of partners in relation to specific investment 
typology. 
Considering economic values, all of the variables related to international trade normally have great 
effect on the transport investments, and our estimations confirm this fact. Table 3 does not show the 
models utilising the openness indicator because it is more interesting to note the different effects of 
the import and export variables: while the former usually has positive coefficients, the latter 
negatively affects the PPIs in the transport sector. This result confirms that exporting countries already 
have a sufficiently reliable network of infrastructures, while importing countries need to upgrade their 
existing transport network to facilitate international trade, reduce their dependence from imports in 
some cases and acquire needed resources and goods. Other general variables, such as GDP and 
Population, are significant, and the signs of their coefficients are as expected. Therefore, the 
willingness of governments to open their economies to international trade is confirmed to be a 
relevant factor for the investment in the transport network; however, with different effects for export 
oriented or import dependent countries. 
Alternative models have been estimated without Brazil (being a potential outlier in the estimations) 
and only considering Mercosur. While the overall robustness of the estimation is affected by these 
operations, it is quite interesting to note a few peculiar results of these further analyses. First of all, 
considering only the Mercosur countries, main relationships are confirmed with all of the main 
elements that are statistically significant. Moreover, exports and FDIs abroad increase their negative 
effects in terms of PPI attractiveness with an increasing effect of private participation. Eventually, 
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Table 4 shows the results removing just Brazil from the sample of considered countries: the table 
shows the model 1, 4, 6, 7. The models show an increasing (positive) impact of FDI in the reported 
economies (FDI_in the shown models) and of private participation, underlining the role of the specific 
policies in promoting such kinds of collaborative projects. Interestingly, while the reduced statistical 
significance of such results affect the possibility to generalize these alternative model conclusions, it 
is important to underline that all main results are confirmed. The only difference seems to be the 
change of sign in the variable “govt” related to the specific political parties governing the country. This 
might be related to the specific industrial structure of Brazil (with many project partially funded by 
public owned conglomerates) that generate distortions in terms of the link between a given political 
strategy and the related PPP investments. 
 
 Table 4 – Results of the performed analysis (excluding Brazil) 
  
Pool OLS - 
Number of 
PPIs 
FE - Number of PPIs FE - PPI Value 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 6 Model 7 
const 
0.12 0.227** −0.107 −106.777 −87.849 
0.107 0.093 0.127 −1.594 66.501 
Private 
0.033*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 3.099***   
0.002 0.001 0.002 3.522   
Govt 
−0.022 −0.056 −0.054 −30.921 −36.931 
0.06 0.063 0.062 −1.054 29.257 
Foreigners 
−0.307   0.089 167.424   
0.231   0.218 1.625   
Mercosur 
0.002   −0.185 −27.390   
0.169   0.214 −0.2661   
Pop 
    0.03*** 15.859*** 1.252 
    0.009 2.768 6.212 
WTO 
0.116   0.166 −45.293   
0.245   0.22 −0.438   
Import 
      7.002* 6.39* 
      1.803 3.797 
Export 
      −6.828* −18.109*** 
      −1.671 4.23 
FDI_Abroad 
      0.019   
      1.135   
FDI_IN 
    0*** 0.009 0.016** 
    0 1.111 0.007 
CAN 
−0.279**         
0.129         
island 
−0.166         
0.103         
south 
0.117         
0.118         
GDP_PPP 
        3.287*** 
        0.473 
LSDV R-
squared 
  0.55 0.56 0.3 0.29 
LSDV F(38, 
1005) 
  41.55 37.8 10.68 11.9 
P-value(F) 3.00E-124 1.10E-148 6.20E-153 3.90E-50 1.07E-51 
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Within R-
squared 
0.45* 0.28 0.3 0.13 0.13 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The current study aimed at investigating the effects of institutions on transport investments and the 
development of the transport network in Latin America and the Caribbean. The literature unanimously 
shows that market openness and other government decisions are important factors in fostering 
economic development (e.g. Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). Nevertheless, not many studies focused 
their attention on transport policies and the institutional environment (e.g. Ng et al., 2013). The 
current research offers a contribution to fill this gap, investigating a particular vehicle for 
implementing transport projects: the PPIs. As previously discussed, PPIs are used worldwide to 
promote transport investments in developing countries, and Latin American and the Caribbean are 
not exceptions. These PPIs helped in fostering international collaboration, transforming the Latin 
American and Caribbean transport system over the last 3 decades. The introduction of such an 
investment promoted new forms of collaboration within and outside the region, influencing the 
organisation of the transport system. 
Addressing the relationships among PPIs to both economic and institutional variables allowed us to 
better understand the relationship among government choices (e.g., the presence in regional 
organisations, the possibility for foreign investors to operate in the markets and private participation), 
economic variables (e.g., imports and exports) and transport network development. 
This relationship showed a clear link between certain government strategies (e.g., participation in 
regional organisations and the promotion of private investors) and the related outcome in terms of 
transport investments. In particular, it is interesting to note the positive (and significant) impact of 
being part of a regional organisation (e.g., Mercosur), as well as involving private companies. On the 
opposite side, a negative effect can be created, attracting foreigner companies. Moreover, the 
differences in the estimation of the number of investments and the value suggest that the size of the 
investment might modify those preferences to achieve particular (national) goals. 
An interesting, even if only briefly mentioned, issue is the timescale of the intervention. Even if the 
variable representing national governments was not significant in the quantitative analysis, it is a 
matter of fact that such kinds of policies characterised conservative governments with a specific time 
scale plan (i.e., first international nodes and then internal networks) in the 1980s; however, in the last 
15 years, these measures have been supported by any government, despite its political view, and they 
differ with the specific needs of the country (e.g., differentiation between exporting countries and 
importing countries). 
The authors are aware that the performed analysis presents some limitations due to the accuracy of 
the dataset and the possibility to enlarge the set of econometric models tested. Nevertheless, the 
results obtained seem interesting and further help to better understand the link between specific 
transport policies and the regional network development. Hopefully, these results will encourage 
further developments to check if similar results also characterise different regions in other continents 
and to better evaluate the effects of the several regional organisations on the development of 
infrastructure endowment. As part of this attempt, it is interesting noticing how both regional logistics 
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performance reports (e.g. Logistics Performance Index [WB, 2017]) as well as some recent research 
study (e.g. Ng et al., 2013; Wilmsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso, 2010) underline how the performance 
of the transport system in Latin American and Caribbean countries is often related to the governance 
of existing as well as new infrastructure and not just the provision of them. Thus, further research will 
focus on better understanding the effects of transport network governance (e.g. management 
models) as well as government incentives on the spatial distribution and performance of the studied 
infrastructure. 
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